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The article by Huang and Bargh (2014)
discusses the role played by conscious and
unconscious goals in the behavior of a per-
son. The authors argue for the existence of
unconscious goals. In addition, they argue
that both conscious and unconscious goals
have similar effects on behavior. In this
commentary, we focus on the implications
of an event-control approach to the con-
scious or unconscious nature of goals and
their influence on perception and action.
The notion of goals and actions per-
formed to achieve those goals indicates
a close link between goals, actions per-
formed to achieve the desired goals,
and consequent perceptual effect. Such
perception-action loops operating at
multiple levels form the core of the
event-control approach that has been pro-
posed to understand consciousness, self
and agency (Jordan, 2003; Kumar and
Srinivasan, 2012, 2013, 2014). In this
approach, the control system is theo-
rized as a nested hierarchical system in
which the lower levels are nested within
the higher levels of the system. The con-
scious goals or intentions would operate
at the higher level. The levels also dif-
fer in terms of the spatiotemporal extent
of events on which control is exercised
with the higher levels linked to more
distal perception-action events and the
lower levels linked to more proximal
perception-action events. According to
the event-control approach, activity at the
higher level constrains activity at the lower
level and the amount of control achieved
given these constraints at the lower level is
passed to the higher level further enabling
the change in constraints passed again to
the lower level. The nature of self depends
on the highest level at which the control is
achieved.
The event-control approach has poten-
tial implications for the principles pro-
posed in the Huang and Bargh (2014)
in discussing the manner in which con-
scious and unconscious goals influence
other mental processes and behavior. Even
assuming the existence of unconscious
goals (the event-control approach can be
neutral about that possibility), the event-
control approach has a lot to say about
the potential ways in which conscious
or unconscious goals influence other
processes.
While Huang and Bargh (2014) focus
on multiple goals (conscious or other-
wise) that potentially compete with each
other, it misses the fact that the mind is
a nested hierarchy with possible goals at
each level in the control hierarchy (Jordan,
2003; Hurley, 2008; Kumar and Srinivasan,
2012, 2014). In addition, both perception
and actions are hierarchically organized.
Each action (or perception) is composed
of other actions (or perceptions) resulting
in a hierarchical structure.
According to the event-control
approach, a specific priming effect might
occur because of the goals at the lower
levels and processes that are part of the
lower level are activated by the typi-
cally conscious higher level goal. This
interpretation implies that even if the
lower level goal is unconscious, there is
a priming effect only when it is activated
indirectly by a conscious goal making it
non-autonomous even if it produces a
subliminal effect on behavior. The effect of
the unconscious goal would be indirect, at
best arguing against the automaticity prin-
ciple. Given that the control processes
at different levels operate at different
spatio-temporal scales, the lower level
goals would influence proximal behav-
ior (like immediate priming effects) more
than the higher level conscious goals. The
influence of these lower level goals would
be reduced or negated in dual task or
high load conditions indicating that the
putative unconscious goals would be sus-
ceptible to attentional influences elicited
by the conscious task being performed.
The event-control approach argues that
not only a higher level goal but relevant
sub-goals might also be active at a given
time. The reconfiguration principle under-
specifies what goals or sub-goals are active
assuming only one active (conscious?) goal
at a time. The event-control approach
does agree with the notion that the active
(high level conscious) goal would con-
strain information processing at the lower
levels of the hierarchical control system.
In addition, as long as the actions them-
selves do not compete with each other,
simultaneous multiple goal achievement is
possible.
In addition, it has to be kept in mind
that establishing the consciousness or
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unconsciousness of goals is not trivial and
depends on themethods available for mea-
suring consciousness or unconsciousness
(Seth et al., 2008). The notion of uncon-
scious effects based on priming have been
questioned in the literature (Newell and
Shanks, 2014) based on potential problems
with the priming methodology (Rouder
et al., 2007). While attempts have been
made to refine the priming methodol-
ogy to produce subliminal priming effects
reliably (Finkbeiner, 2011), most studies
simply report a null effect in a sepa-
rate classification task performed with the
prime stimuli (Marien et al., 2012). Given
these difficulties, it is not clear that the
unconscious nature of the goals has been
rigorously established in empirical studies
so far.
In conclusion, we argue that more rig-
orous demonstration of unconscious goals
is necessary. In addition, it is not clear
that an unconscious goal autonomously
influences behavior unless it is possi-
bly activated by a conscious goal (which
is present even in a subliminal prim-
ing task). The notion of nested hier-
archical control with multiple sub-goals
at lower levels is important for under-
standing the role of conscious or uncon-
scious goals and intentions in performing
actions.
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